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In this paper we focus on some of the dynamic aspects of micro-lending
institutions,1 in particular those involving group-lending.2
Traditionally the literature has focussed on joint liability, where, in case
of default by some member, the other members have to make up the deﬁcit.
The objective is to analyze the eﬃcacy of joint liability in triggering peer
monitoring3 and homogenous group-formation.4
Group-lending schemes, however, also involve many other subtle fea-
tures. In fact, Aghion and Morduch (2005, pp. 119) argue that today joint
liability is only one of the elements that diﬀerentiate micro-ﬁnance from
traditional banking. Unfortunately, however, these have attracted relatively
little attention in the literature. We focus on two such dynamic schemes,
namely sequential ﬁnancing and contingent renewal.
In the Grameen Bank, for example, the groups have ﬁve members each.
Loans are sequential in the sense that these are initially given to only two
of the members (to be repaid over a period of one year). If they manage to
pay the initial instalments then, after a month or so, another two borrow-
ers receive loans and so on.5 Despite some recent works (discussed later),
sequential ﬁnancing remains poorly understood.
Contingent renewal of loans refers to the feature that in case of default
by a group, no member of this group ever receives a loan in the future.
Moreover, in case of repayment, there is repeat lending. Many authors,
including Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), Khandker et al. (1995), and Ray
(1999), argue that contingent renewal is an important element behind the
1Relatively recent surveys include Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) and Morduch (1999).
2According to Hossein (1988), the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, as well as ACCION-
aﬃliated ones in Latin America have a repayment rate in excess of 95 percent. Christen,
Rhyne, and Vogel (1994) and Morduch (1999) all report similar ﬁgures.
3Banerjee et al. (1994), Conning (1996), Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), Stiglitz (1990),
and Varian (1990), all emphasize the importance of peer monitoring.
4Ghatak (1999, 2000) and Tassel (1999) demonstrate that joint liability lending leads
to positive assortative matching so that borrowers of the same type club together.
5See, for example, Morduch (1999). As an example of a group-lending scheme that
does not involve sequential ﬁnancing, consider the BancoSol program in urban Bolivia.
1success of many group-lending schemes.6
The relative neglect of dynamic features is surprising given that in reality
micro-lending institutions do not always enforce joint liability. Loan oﬃcers
in Asia and Latin America, for example, say that they see no reason to
punish everyone for the actions of a single person (Aghion and Morduch
(2005, pp. 113)). In fact, in case of default, the original Grameen idea was
not that group-members would have to pay for others, but rather that they
would be cut oﬀ from future loans. Furthermore, some recent group-lending
schemes, e.g. ASA in Bangladesh and even the Grameen, have seen a move
away from strict joint liability (Aghion and Morduch (2005), pp. 119).
We focus on the eﬃcacy of these two dynamic schemes in harnessing
social capital. Such social capital may take the form of mutual help in times
of distress (see Coate and Ravallion (1993)), mutual reliance in productive
activities, status in the local community, etc. In case default by one borrower
harms the other borrowers, such default may be be penalized through a loss
of this social capital.7 Social penalties may also take the form of a reduced
level of cooperation, or even admonishment.8
We ﬁnd that our dynamic framework yields some interesting new insights
which cannot be replicated in a static framework. As an example, we can
mention our central result that, under certain circumstances, the lending
bank can test for the type of a group by lending to just one of the members,
thus screening out bad borrowers partially.
Furthermore, even in cases where joint liability is not being imposed,
given sequential ﬁnancing and contingent renewal, actions taken by one
member of a group would still aﬀect the others. Given that such interdepen-
dence is a key implication of joint liability, the question naturally arises as to
whether, in such situations, the joint liability assumption can be interpreted
as a convenient shortcut to the descriptively more realistic case of sequen-
6To rephrase, sequential ﬁnancing refers to group-loans that are staggered within the
same round, whereas contingent renewal implies that the selection of the recipient group
is history dependent.
7In fact, in a study of group-lending in Guatemala, Wydick (1999) ﬁnds that for groups
located in rural areas, group pressures play an important role in ensuring loan repayment.
8According to Rahman (1999), women are specially sensitive to such admonishments.
2tial ﬁnancing with contingent renewal? Our analysis allows us to identify
conditions under which such a static approach may or may not generate the
correct results, in particular regarding the nature of group-formation.
We build a simple inﬁnite-horizon dynamic model based on social capital,
moral hazard and endogenous group-formation. There are many borrowers,
all of whom have access to two projects where the ﬁrst one has a veriﬁable
income, but no private beneﬁt (non-veriﬁable), while the second one has
a private beneﬁt, but no veriﬁable income. Thus there is a moral hazard
problem.9 The borrowers are heterogenous, so that some borrowers (denoted
the S type) have access to social capital, while the others (denoted the N
type) do not. For an S type borrower, social penalty involves the withdrawal
of this social capital whenever default by this borrower harms the other
group members. The bank prefers the ﬁrst project (when it can recoup its
initial investment), while at least the N type borrowers prefer the second
one. Hence the bank may be unwilling to lend at all.
There is endogenous group formation whereby, prior to the actual lend-
ing, the borrowers form groups of size two among themselves.10 The key
issue is whether there will be positive assortative matching or negative, i.e.
whether group-formation will be homogenous, or not.
We then brieﬂy discuss our main results.
Consider the case where sequential ﬁnancing is used in conjunction with
contingent renewal. For intermediate values of the discount factor there is
positive assortative matching, so that the bank can ascertain the identity of
a group without lending to all its members, thus screening out bad borrowers
partially. In fact, the bank can ﬁnd out the identity of a group quite cheaply,
by lending once to just one member of a group. Hence, group-lending is
feasible under the appropriate parameter values.
This works as follows. Because of sequential ﬁnancing and contingent
renewal, default by an S type borrower adversely aﬀects her partner, who
receives no further loans from the bank. Since any such default attracts the
9In case of the Grameen Bank, Todd (1996) argues that loan applicants often misrep-
resent the objectives of their loans.
10Ghatak (2000) provides evidence to suggest that endogenous group-formation is a key
component behind the success of many group-lending schemes.
3social penalty, S type borrowers invest in their ﬁrst projects, thus resolving
the moral hazard problem partially. Furthermore, since members of SS
type groups always repay, given contingent renewal they receive an inﬁnite
sequence of loans. Given that the discount factor is reasonably large, SS
type groups are quite attractive, leading to positive assortative matching.
Interestingly, if the discount factor is small enough, then there is nega-
tive assortative matching. This happens because, with the discount factor
being small, SS type groups are not very attractive. However, this does not
necessarily imply that group-lending will be infeasible.
Thus, depending on parameter values, there may be either positive or
negative assortative matching. Both Ghatak (1999, 2000) and Tassel (1999),
however, ﬁnd that under their (mainly static) setups there is necessarily
positive assortative matching. Hence our analysis identiﬁes conditions under
which the traditional Ghatak (1999, 2000) and Tassel (1999) type results
may or may not go through in a dynamic framework.
We then argue that sequential ﬁnancing is critical since, in its absence,
the borrowers may collude among themselves. Let us consider a scenario
where the selection of the recipient group is history dependent, but in any
round all members of the recipient group receive the loans simultaneously. If
the borrowers coordinate on their second projects, then, since the borrowers
are not going to get future loans anyway, such default does not attract the
social penalty. Consequently, collusion occurs unless the discount factor is
large (when a trigger-strategy kind of argument goes through).
Such coordination is captured through our use of renegotiation-proofness,
which thus plays a critical part in the argument. As is well known, the no-
tion of renegotiation-proofness allows for communication among the agents.
Given that the paper focuses on lending to communities with close interac-
tions, it seems natural to allow for such coordination.
We ﬁnally argue that, if the social penalty is only triggered when S type
borrowers are aﬀected, then while sequential ﬁnancing by itself may be fea-
sible, a combination of sequential ﬁnancing and contingent renewal may not
be. In the latter case, there is negative assortative matching whenever the
discount factor is small. Given the social penalty function, S type borrowers
default whenever they have an N type partner. Hence the result.
4We then relate our paper to the literature. In a strategic repayment
game with social capital, Besley and Coate (1995) demonstrate that joint
liability may harness social collateral, thus partially mitigating the negative
eﬀects of group-lending. On the other hand, in a framework where the
borrowers diﬀer in their unobserved sanctioning capacities, Bond and Rai
(2004) examine the eﬃciency of joint liability group-loans vis-a-vis co-signed
loans. While the presence of social capital is central to our analysis as well,
note that the central problem examined in this paper is one of moral hazard,
rather than limited enforcement. Moreover, unlike both the above papers,
we allow for endogenous group formation.
As in Ghatak (1999, 2000) and Tassel (1999), we also allow for endoge-
nous group-formation. In our model, however, the heterogeneity arises not
because one group of borrowers is safer, or more able, but because one group
has more social capital compared to the other. Furthermore, we show that
for some parameter values there may be negative assortative matching.
We then consider the literature on sequential ﬁnancing. Ray (1999) pro-
vides an explanation of sequential ﬁnancing based on coordination failures
in case of voluntary default. In a model with moral hazard, Roy Chowd-
hury (2005) argues that sequential ﬁnancing enhances the incentive for peer
monitoring and may, even in the absence of joint liability, solve the moral
hazard problem. Aniket (2004) shows that by temporally separating the
decision on peer-monitoring and investment, sequential ﬁnancing makes col-
lusion impossible. In contrast to Aniket (2004) and Roy Chowdhury (2005),
however, we allow for endogenous group-formation, an issue not dealt with
in Aniket (2004) and Roy Chowdhury (2005). Furthermore, in contrast to
most of the literature, we use an explicitly dynamic framework where se-
quential ﬁnancing and contingent renewal are used in conjunction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe
the economic environment. In Section 3 we analyze sequential ﬁnancing
without contingent renewal. The interaction between sequential ﬁnancing
and contingent renewal is analyzed in Section 4. In Section 5 we brieﬂy
examine an alternative form of the social penalty. Section 6 discusses some
modelling assumptions, while Section 7 concludes. Some of the technical
material can be found in the Appendix.
52 The Economic Environment
The market consists of many borrowers, such that their mass is normalized
to one, and none of the borrowers is an atom. Borrower i can invest in one
of two projects, P1
i or P2
i . For every i, P1
i has a veriﬁable income of H, and
no non-veriﬁable income, whereas P2
i has no veriﬁable income, and a non-
veriﬁable income of b, where 0 < b < H. The sets of projects are diﬀerent
for diﬀerent borrowers. While the borrowers know the identity of their own
projects, they do not know the identity of the other borrowers’ projects. In
every period, the borrowers consume all their income in that period.
All projects require an initial investment of 1 dollar. Since none of the
borrowers have any funds, they have to borrow the required 1 dollar from
a bank. The bank also does not know the identity of the projects, so that
there is a moral hazard problem. The loan can be taken either individually,
or as a group. For every dollar loaned, the amount to be repaid is r (≥ 1),
where r is exogenously given.11
Thus there are signiﬁcant rigidities in the rate of interest. This is likely
to be the case whenever it is exogenously ﬁxed by the government, per-
haps on political grounds. This is especially plausible if the lending bank
is government controlled. Even if, say, the bank is run by an NGO, the
government may have some control over its activities, specially if the NGO
is funded (at least partially) by the government.
For the project to be proﬁtable for the borrowers it must be that H > r.
For simplicity we assume that H ≤ 2r, so that r < H ≤ 2r.
A fraction 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 of the borrowers have a social capital of s (> 0),
whereas the other borrowers have no social capital. The borrowers with
social capital are denoted by S, whereas the other borrowers are denoted
by N. The social penalty involves a loss of this social capital. An S type
borrower taking a group loan is assumed to lose her social capital if she
defaults and moreover, this default aﬀects the other group-member.12 Thus
11We follow Besley and Coate (1995) in assuming that the rate of interest is exogenous.
However, some authors e.g. Ghatak (1999, 2000), Tassel (1999) etc. do take the rate of
interest to be endogenous.
12Note that the social penalty is imposed only in case it aﬀects the other borrower.
6the social penalty is anonymous in the sense that it is imposed irrespective
of whether the default aﬀects an S type, or an N type borrower.13 The
borrowers all know one another’s types, but the bank does not.
We assume that the magnitude of the moral hazard problem, quantiﬁed
by b, is not too small.
Assumption 1. H − r < b.
Suppose that a borrower has taken a loan of 1 dollar. If the borrower is
of type N, then, given Assumption 1, she will prefer to invest in her second
project. Further, we assume that the social capital s is not too small.
Assumption 2. H − r > b − s.
Suppose some borrower of type S has taken a loan and that she will lose
her social capital in case of default. In case she invests in her second project,
she obtains a non-veriﬁable income of b, but loses her social capital, so that
her net payoﬀ is b − s. Given Assumption 2, the borrower will prefer to
invest in her ﬁrst project.
3 Sequential Financing
In this section we examine the eﬀect of sequential ﬁnancing on group-lending.
For the moment we abstract from contingent renewal, which will be intro-
duced in the next section. This section, as well as sub-section 4.1, provide
useful benchmarks for the later analysis. Of course, given the diverse lend-
ing schemes adopted by micro-ﬁnance institutions, these are of interest in
themselves.
Time is discrete so that t = 0,1,2,···. Let 0 < δ < 1 denote the common
discount factor of all the agents, the borrowers, as well as the bank.
3.1 Group-lending Without Sequential Financing
In this sub-section we examine a group-lending game without sequential
ﬁnancing. We consider the following inﬁnite horizon game.
Thus it satisﬁes Assumption 1(i) in Besley and Coate (1995).
13In Section 5, we consider an alternative form of the social penalty function.
7Period 0. There is endogenous group formation whereby the borrowers
organize themselves into groups of two. Depending on the type of borrowers
comprising the groups, these can be of three types, SS, NN and SN. We
assume that the group-formation process follows the optimal sorting princi-
ple,14 in the sense that borrowers from diﬀerent groups cannot form a new
group without making some member of the new group worse oﬀ.15
For every t ≥ 1, there is a two stage game:
Stage 1. The bank randomly selects one of the groups as the recipient
and lends it two dollars, which are divided equally among the two members
of the selected group. Note that the lending policy of the bank does not
involve contingent renewal.16
Stage 2. Both the borrowers then simultaneously invest 1 dollar into
one of their two projects. If the i−th borrower invests in P1
i she has a
payoﬀ of H −r, otherwise she has a payoﬀ of b. Note that given the lending
policy, default by a borrower does not aﬀect the expected income of the
other borrower, and hence does not attract the social penalty even if she
is of type S. The bank has a payoﬀ of 2(r − 1) in case both the borrowers
invest in their ﬁrst projects, r − 2 in case only one of the borrowers invests
in her ﬁrst project and the other borrower invests in her second project, and
a payoﬀ of −2 in case both the borrowers invest in their second projects.
We need some more deﬁnitions before we can proceed further.
Deﬁnition. There is positive assortative matching if there are θ
2 groups
of type SS, and 1−θ
2 groups of type NN.
Deﬁnition. There is negative assortative matching if there are min{θ,1−
θ} groups of type SN, max{1−2θ
2 ,0} groups of type NN, and max{2θ−1
2 ,0}
groups of type SS.
We then describe our solution concept. We ﬁrst solve for the renegotiation-
14In this context the optimal sorting principle was ﬁrst used by Ghatak (1999, 2000).
Ghatak (1999), in turn, traces this idea to Becker (1993).
15It is clear that the optimal sorting principle is closely related to the core, as well as
the idea of stability.
16Given that we are interested in examining the implications of various lending policies,
we model the bank as a non-strategic agent following some ﬁxed lending policy. Of course,
this also simpliﬁes the analysis, as well as the exposition.
8proof equilibria of the period 1 game (a formal deﬁnition of renegotiation-
proofness has been provided in the appendix). Next, the period 0 game is
solved using the optimal sorting principle. This solution concept will be
used throughout the paper.
The notion of renegotiation-proofness used here draws on Bernheim and
Ray (1989).17 Following their idea, we look for equilibria that are consis-
tent over subgames that are identical as far as the continuation games are
concerned. Note that in the context of our paper, such subgames can be
identiﬁed with the identity of the borrowing group selected by the bank.
Clearly the notion of renegotiation-proofness (as well as the optimal sort-
ing principle to be introduced later on) allows for coordination among the
agents. In the context of lending to rural communities with close interac-
tions, allowing for such coordination may not be too unreasonable though.
Given the lending policy of the bank, once a group receives a loan, this
group has zero probability of receiving a loan in the future. Hence the
members of this group are going to behave as if they are playing a one shot
game. Thus, it is suﬃcient to examine a one period version of the game.
Let vij denote the expected equilibrium payoﬀ of a type i borrower at
some period t ≥ 1 if she forms a group with a type j borrower and the group
receives the bank loan at this period.
Assuming that side payments are possible, there will be positive assor-
tative matching if and only if the maximum a type N borrower is willing
to pay to a type S borrower, is strictly less than the minimum a type S
borrower will need as compensation for having a type N partner i.e.
vSS − vSN > vNS − vNN. (1)
Clearly, there will be negative assortative matching whenever vSS +
vNN < vSN +vNS. In case vSS +vNN = vSN +vNS, there is no strong justi-
ﬁcation for either positive, or negative assortative matching. In general we
can expect that there will be x groups of type SN, where x ≤ min{θ,1−θ},
17In the presence of contingent renewal, note that the set of players still eligible for loan
(i.e. the state of the game) is a function of history. In this respect the present framework
diﬀers from that in Bernheim and Ray (1989).
9and the remaining borrowers will form groups with their own types. How-
ever, for ease of exposition we assume that in this case there will be negative
assortative matching, i.e. x = min{θ,1 − θ}.18
We then turn to the solution of this game. Consider some period t ≥ 1.
Stage 3: For any borrower, her payoﬀ from investing in her ﬁrst project
is H −r, whereas her payoﬀ from investing in her second project is b. Given
Assumption 1, both the borrowers will invest in their second projects irre-
spective of their type. Thus
vSS = vSN = vNN = vNS = b. (2)
Stage 2. Since the borrowers always invest in their second project, the
bank’s expected payoﬀ at any period from making a loan is −2.
Stage 1. Given equation (2), the tie-breaking rule implies that there
will be negative assortative matching. Of course, the expected payoﬀ of the
bank is independent of the nature of the matching.
Summarizing the above discussion we obtain our ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1. Group-lending without sequential ﬁnancing is not feasible.
In this case default by a borrower does not aﬀect her partner’s payoﬀ
and hence, even for an S type, does not attract the social penalty. Thus,
given the parameter restrictions, the borrowers always invest in their second
projects, so that lending is not feasible.
Remark 1. It is clear that our analysis goes through even if H > 2r.
3.2 Group-lending With Sequential Financing
In this sub-section we examine a group-lending scheme with sequential ﬁ-
nancing, but no contingent renewal. Thus, in every round, the members of
the selected group receives loans in a staggered manner, but the selection
18Fortunately, it turns out that whenever the borrowers are indiﬀerent between positive
and negative assortative matching, the expected payoﬀ of the bank is independent of the
nature of the matching. Hence, our basic results would still go through if we adopt a
diﬀerent tie-breaking rule.
10of the recipient group is independent of history. We consider the following
game.
Period 0. There is endogenous group formation whereby the borrowers
organize themselves into groups of two.
For every t ≥ 1, there is a three stage game:
Stage 1. The bank randomly selects a group, and lends the selected
group 1 dollar. Thus, as in the previous sub-section, there is no contingent
renewal.
Stage 2. One of the borrowers is randomly selected (with probability
half) by the group as the recipient of the 1 dollar lent by the bank. (One can
alternatively assume that this selection is done by the bank.) This borrower,
say Bi, then decides whether to invest the 1 dollar in P1
i , or P2
i . If Bi invests
in P2
i , then Bi defaults, there is no further loan by the bank and the game
goes to the next period. Note that in case of default by Bi, Bj does not
obtain the loan at all. Hence depending on its type, Bi obtains either b, or
b−s. If Bi invests in P1
i , then there is a veriﬁable return of H, out of which
the bank is repaid r, and Bi obtains H − r. We assume that H − r < 1,
so that this amount is not suﬃcient to ﬁnance the investment in the next
stage.19 Since we are interested in analyzing the implications of sequential
ﬁnancing, this assumption is a natural one to make.
Stage 3. This stage arises only if Bi had invested in P1
i in stage 2. The
bank lends a further 1 dollar to the group which is allocated to the other
borrower, Bj, who decides whether to invest it in P1
j , or P2
j . Note that in
this case default by Bj does not aﬀect the payoﬀ of Bi, the group-member
who had received the loan earlier. Hence if this amount is invested in P2
j ,
then Bj obtains b, and the bank obtains nothing. If its invested in P1
j , then
Bj obtains H − r and the bank obtains r.20
19Since r ≥ 1, the condition that H − r < 1 implies that H < 2r. Thus the assumption
that H < 2r plays a role here as well.
20Alternatively, we can assume that the second borrower obtains the loan in the next
period. Our analysis, not reported here, shows that this does not aﬀect the results quali-
tatively. Moreover, the formulation adopted in the text is not too unrealistic. Under the
Grameen Bank, for example, loans are meant to be repaid in weekly installments, with
the loans to the later borrowers being released once the ﬁrst few installments are made.
11As in the previous sub-section, for t ≥ 1 it is suﬃcient to restrict atten-
tion to one-shot games.
Let ˆ vij denote the expected equilibrium payoﬀ of a type i borrower at
some period t ≥ 1, in case she forms a group with a type j borrower and
this group obtains the loan at this period.
We next turn to solving this game. Consider t ≥ 1.
Stage 3. Both types of borrowers would invest in their second projects.
Stage 2. Given that borrowers of both types default in stage 3, in stage
2, S type borrowers will invest in their ﬁrst projects (Assumption 2), and N
type borrowers will invest in their second projects (Assumption 1). Hence
ˆ vSS =
H − r + b
2
, ˆ vSN =
H − r
2
, ˆ vNN =
b
2
and ˆ vNS = b. (3)
Stage 1. It is easy to see that, irrespective of the nature of the
matching process, the expected per period payoﬀ of the bank is
θr − 1 − θ. (4)
This follows because the investment decision of a borrower does not depend
on the nature of the group, but only on whether the borrower is the ﬁrst
recipient of the loan or not.
Period 0. Given equation (3), it is easy to see that group-formation
would lead to negative assortative matching. Of course, the expected payoﬀ
of the bank is independent of the exact nature of the matching.
Summarizing the above discussion we obtain our next proposition.
Proposition 2. Sequential ﬁnancing is feasible if and only if θr−1−θ ≥
0.21
Under sequential ﬁnancing, default by the ﬁrst recipient of the group-
loan adversely aﬀects her partner (who does not obtain any loan). Hence, for
type S borrowers, the social capital is brought into play, so that they invest
in their ﬁrst projects. Thus the moral hazard problem is resolved partially
and group-lending may be feasible. Further, note that group-lending may
be feasible even if there is negative assortative matching.
21Note, for example, that θr−1−θ ≥ 0 if H = 4, r = 3.1, b = 3.5, s = 2.9 and θ = 0.5.
12Remark 2. Consider the case where, in case the loan goes to a group
of type SN, the S type borrower is the ﬁrst recipient with probability α,
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. In this case it is easy to see that
ˆ vSS =
H − r + b
2
, ˆ vSN(α) = α(H − r), ˆ vNN =
b
2
, and ˆ vNS(α) = b. (5)
Moreover, there is negative assortative matching if and only if α ≥ 1
2. Thus,
somewhat surprisingly, positive assortative matching is more likely when the
‘bargaining power’ of the S type agents is low, in the sense that α is small.
4 Contingent Renewal and Sequential Financing
In this section we analyze the interaction of sequential ﬁnancing with con-
tingent renewal schemes, namely repeat lending and withholding of future
loans from all group-members in case of default.22
4.1 Contingent Renewal Without Sequential Financing
We then consider a game where the selection of the recipient group is history
dependent, but in any round, all members of the recipient group receive loans
simultaneously:
In period 0, the borrowers endogenously form groups of size two.
For every t ≥ 1, there is a two stage game with the following sequence
of actions.
Stage 1. At t = 1 the bank lends some randomly selected group 2
dollars. Next consider t > 1. In case the recipient group at t−1 had repaid
its loans, at t the bank makes a repeat loan to this group. In case the
recipient group had defaulted at t−1, no member of this group ever obtains
a loan, either at t, or in the future. In that case, the bank lends 2 dollars to
some randomly selected group (among those who had not defaulted earlier).
Thus there is contingent renewal.
Stage 2. The borrowers simultaneously make their project choice.
22We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting that we allow for multiple
loans.
13Let Vij denote the expected equilibrium payoﬀ of a type i borrower in
period t ≥ 1, in case she forms a group with a type j borrower and this
group obtains the loan in period t.
We next turn to solving this game. The proofs of Proposition 3 below,
as well as Proposition 5 later on, can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 3. (i) If δ ≥ b−H+r
b , then the unique renegotiation-proof
equilibrium involves borrowers of both types investing in their ﬁrst projects
at every period they obtain the loan.
(ii) If δ < b−H+r
b , then the unique renegotiation-proof equilibrium in-
volves all the borrowers investing in their second projects at every period
they obtain the loan.
Proposition 3 is quite intuitive. Consider δ ≥ b−H+r
b . It is clear that,
even under individual lending, contingent renewal would lead a borrower to
invest in her ﬁrst project whenever she obtains the loan. The same result
goes through under group-lending also, since, for an S type borrower, the
incentive to invest in her ﬁrst project is higher (because of social capital),
whereas for an N type borrower the incentives are the same.
Next consider δ < b−H+r
b . Under individual lending with contingent re-
newal, any borrower would invest in her second project whenever she gets
the loan. Next let us consider group-lending. Why does not the presence of
social capital upset this result? Suppose the loan goes to the group BiBj,
where Bj is of type S. Let the borrowers coordinate on the outcome where
both invest in their second projects. Given that Bi is investing in her second
project, she will not obtain any more loans in the future anyway. Hence her
payoﬀ is not adversely aﬀected even if Bj defaults, so that such default does
not attract the social penalty. Further, given that δ < b−H+R
b , this strat-
egy payoﬀ dominates any other subgame perfect equilibria. Consequently
the borrowers coordinate on this outcome. Formally, this coordination is
captured by our use of the notion of renegotiation-proofness.
Given Proposition 3, it is easy to see that
VSS = VSN = VNN = VNS =
H − r
1 − δ
, if δ ≥
b − H + r
b
, (6)
VSS = VSN = VNN = VNS = b, otherwise. (7)
14In case δ ≥ b−H+r
b , the borrowers always invest in their ﬁrst projects,
and the bank has a per period payoﬀ of 2(r−1) > 0. If, however, δ < b−H+r
b
then the borrowers always invest in their second projects, so that the bank
makes a loss.
We can now write down our next proposition.
Proposition 4. Group-lending with contingent renewal, but without
sequential ﬁnancing is feasible if and only if δ ≥ b−H+r
b .23
Thus, for δ ≥ b−H+r
b , the ﬁrst best outcome is implemented.24 The argu-
ment clearly relies on the trigger strategy like aspect of contingent renewal.
For δ < b−H+r
b , however, all the borrowers invest in their second projects,
so that contingent renewal fails to resolve the moral hazard problem.
Further, as argued earlier, under individual lending with contingent re-
newal, analogues of Propositions 3 and 4 go through. Thus the presence of
social capital does not aﬀect the performance of contingent renewal schemes.
4.2 Contingent Renewal With Sequential Financing
We consider the following game.
In period 0, the borrowers endogenously form groups of size two.
For every t ≥ 1, there is a three stage game with the following sequence
of actions.
Stage 1. At t = 1 the bank lends some randomly selected group 1
dollars. Consider t > 1. In case the recipient group at t − 1 had repaid its
loans, the bank gives the group 1 dollar in this period. In case the recipient
group at t − 1 had defaulted, no member of this group ever obtains a loan
in this period, or in the future. Moreover, the bank lends 1 dollar to some
randomly selected group (among those who had not defaulted earlier).
23Consider the earlier example where H = 4, r = 3.1, b = 3.5, s = 2.9 and θ = 0.5.
Contingent renewal by itself is feasible if and only if δ ≥
26
35.
24This result is in contrast to Bulow and Rogoﬀ (1989) who argue that lending cannot
be sustained using a purely reputational argument. Note, however, that in our framework
the borrowers consume all their current income. Hence, in contrast to Bulow and Rogoﬀ
(1989), they cannot use their income to ﬁnance future projects and are dependent on the
bank in every period. We are indebted to a referee for this point.
15Stage 2. One of the borrowers is randomly selected (with probability
half) as the recipient of the 1 dollar lent by the bank. This borrower, say
Bi, then decides whether to invest the 1 dollar in P1
i , or P2
i . If Bi invests
in P2
i , then, depending on her type, Bi obtains either b, or b − s, and the
bank obtains nothing. In that case, there is no further loan in this period,
and the game moves to the next period. If Bi invests in P1
i , then the bank
is repaid r, Bi obtains H − r and the game goes to the next stage.
Stage 3. The bank lends a further 1 dollar to the group which is allo-
cated to the other borrower, Bj, who decides whether to invest it in P1
j , or
P2
j . If she invests in P2
i , then, depending on her type, Bj obtains either b,
or b − s, and the bank obtains nothing. If she invests in P1
j , then the bank
is repaid r, and Bj obtains H − r.
Let ˆ Vij denote the expected equilibrium payoﬀ of a type i borrower in
period t ≥ 1, in case it forms a group with a type j borrower and this group
obtains the loan in period t.
We begin by solving for the set of renegotiation-proof equilibria in stage
2 of period 1.
Proposition 5. (i) If δ ≥ b−H+r
b , then the unique renegotiation-proof
equilibrium involves borrowers of both types investing in their ﬁrst projects
at every stage when they obtain the loan.
(ii) If δ < b−H+r
b , then the unique renegotiation-proof equilibrium in-
volves the S type borrowers investing in their ﬁrst projects, and the N type
borrower investing in their second projects at every stage when they obtain
the loan.
Let us compare Proposition 5 with Proposition 3. Critically, in this
case the S type borrowers invest in their ﬁrst projects even if δ < b−H+r
b .
Thus, for the S types, the incentive to invest in their ﬁrst projects is greater
compared to the case where there is contingent renewal, but no sequential
ﬁnancing. This is because in this case default by an S type borrower ad-
versely aﬀects her partner (which it does not under contingent renewal alone
if her partner is also defaulting). In case the S type borrower is the ﬁrst
recipient, her partner receives no loan in this period, as well as in the future.
16Whereas if she is the second recipient, her partner obtains no loan in the
future. Hence any default by an S type borrower attracts the social penalty.
Similarly, comparing Proposition 5 with Proposition 2, we ﬁnd that in case
there is sequential ﬁnancing alone, an S type invests in her ﬁrst project if
she is the ﬁrst recipient, but not otherwise. Thus the incentive to invest in
the ﬁrst projects is higher in case both the schemes are used in conjunction.
Propositions 3 and 5 together provide an answer to Aghion and Morduch
(2005, pp. 86) who ask, “Might groups collude against the microlender by
collectively deciding not to repay? If the group of borrowers is not willing
to impose social sanctions against itself, can the group nonetheless provide
advantages?” Our analysis shows that such collusion is possible in case the
discount factor is not too large, and the lending scheme involves contin-
gent renewal alone. However, in case the scheme also involves sequential
ﬁnancing, for intermediate values of the discount factor such collusion is not
possible and the group still have some advantages. Note that this is rem-
iniscent of Aniket (2004) who argues that sequential ﬁnancing plays a role
in preventing collusion.
Given Proposition 5, we have that
ˆ VSS = ˆ VSN = ˆ VNN = ˆ VNS =
H − r
1 − δ
, if δ ≥






, ˆ VSN =
H − r
2
, ˆ VNN =
b
2
, ˆ VNS = b, otherwise. (9)
Next, from equations (8) and (9), there is going to be positive assortative
matching if and only if b−H+r
b+H−r < δ < b−H+r
b .
We then solve for the payoﬀ of the bank. In case δ ≥ b−H+r
b , the bor-
rowers always invest in their ﬁrst projects, and the bank has a per period
payoﬀ of 2(r − 1) > 0. From the tie-breaking rule there will be negative
assortative matching, though, of course, the nature of matching does not
aﬀect the expected payoﬀ of the bank.
If b−H+r
b+H−r < δ < b−H+r
b , then there will be positive assortative matching
and the expected payoﬀ of the bank is
2θ(r − 1) − (1 − δ)(1 − θ)
(1 − δ)[1 − δ(1 − θ)]
. (10)
17Finally, if δ ≤ b−H+r
b+H−r, then there is negative assortative matching. Thus the
expected payoﬀ of the bank is
2(2θ − 1)(r − 1) + (1 − δ)(1 − θ)(r − 3)





θr − θ − 1
1 − δ
, otherwise. (12)
We can now write down our next proposition.
Proposition 6. (i) There is positive assortative matching if and only if
b−H+r
b+H−r < δ < b−H+r
b .
(ii) If δ ≥ b−H+r
b , then group-lending with both sequential ﬁnancing and
contingent renewal is feasible. For δ < b−H+r
b , group-lending is feasible if
and only if
(a) b−H+r
b+H−r < δ < b−H+r
b and 2θ(r − 1) − (1 − δ)(1 − θ) ≥ 0, or
(b) δ < b−H+r
b+H−r, θ ≥ 1/2 and 2(2θ −1)(r −1)+(1−δ)(1−θ)(r −3) ≥ 0,
or
(c) δ < b−H+r
b+H−r, θ < 1/2 and θr − θ − 1 ≥ 0.25
Proposition 6(i) is the central result of this paper. The intuition is as
follows. For δ < b−H+r
b , the lending policy ensures that S type borrowers
invest in their ﬁrst projects, whereas N type borrowers invest in their second
projects. If, in addition, b−H+r
b+H−r < δ, then contingent renewal ensures that
SS type groups are very proﬁtable, leading to positive assortative match-
ing. Thus in case an NN type group obtains the loan, the ﬁrst recipient
will default and the other N type borrower will not get a loan at all. Thus,
sequential ﬁnancing acts as a partial screening mechanism whereby the iden-
tity of the good and bad groups can be ascertained relatively cheaply.26 This





all borrowers invest in their ﬁrst projects and group-lending is feasible. Next consider
δ <
26
35. In footnote 28, we argue that a suﬃcient condition for group-lending to be
feasible is that θr − θ − 1 ≥ 0, i.e. θ ≥ 0.476.
26In reality groups have more than two members. Hence, in case sequential ﬁnancing
with contingent renewal leads to positive assortative matching, the partial screening eﬀect
will assume a greater signiﬁcance. Further, given that all borrowers are inﬁnitesimally
small, the partial screening eﬀect does not improve the pool of borrowers. However, in
case there are a ﬁnite number of borrowers this eﬀect would also come into play.
18ensures that group-lending is feasible under the appropriate parameter val-
ues (footnote 25).
Note that, in the presence of sequential ﬁnancing, contingent renewal
has a dual role. Not only does it promote positive assortative matching, it
also increases the incentive to invest in the ﬁrst projects. This is interesting
since, for δ < b−H+r
b , contingent renewal by itself fails to solve the moral
hazard problem.
We then observe that for δ ≤ b−H+r
b+H−r, given that the discount factor is
small, SS type groups are not very attractive, so that the outcome involves
negative assortative matching. Further, given that in this case the partial
screening eﬀect does not operate, the expected payoﬀ of the bank is lower
compared to what it would have been under positive assortative matching.
This, however, does not necessarily imply that group-lending will be infea-
sible (footnote 25).
Given that Ghatak (1999, 2000) and Tassel (1999) demonstrate that
joint liability lending leads to positive assortative matching, the possibility
of negative assortative matching is of some interest. Another paper that
demonstrates the possibility of negative assortative matching is Chatterjee
and Sarangi (2004). They use a model with costly group-formation, where
these costs are contingent on the nature of group-formation.
Given the above discussion, what should be the optimal lending policy
in case δ ≤ b−H+r
b+H−r? From Proposition 4, contingent renewal lending by itself
is not feasible. Next let us consider sequential ﬁnancing by itself. For θ < 1
2,
the bank’s payoﬀ in this case is the same as that when sequential ﬁnancing
and contingent renewal are used together (see equation (12)). For θ ≥ 1
2,
however, a combination of sequential ﬁnancing and contingent renewal payoﬀ
dominates sequential ﬁnancing by itself (i.e. the payoﬀ in (11) exceeds that
in (12)). This is because for θ ≥ 1
2, there will be some SS type groups
even under negative assortative matching. Since, the S type borrowers have
a greater incentive to invest whenever sequential ﬁnancing and contingent
renewal are used in conjunction, the result follows.
195 A Non-anonymous Social Penalty Function
Recall that so far the social penalty has been taken to be anonymous. A
natural alternative may be to assume that it is imposed whenever default
by an S type borrower harms other S type borrowers, but not otherwise. We
call such a social penalty function non-anonymous. We next re-examine our
results under this alternative social penalty function.
5.1 Sequential Financing
Consider a game that is the same as that in Section 3.2, with the diﬀerence
that we now use the alternative social penalty function. It is easy to see that
the analysis is Section 3.2 goes through for SS, or NN type groups. However,
given that the social penalty is non-anonymous, an S type borrower would
behave like an N type, if her partner is an N type. Hence
ˆ vSS =
H − r + b
2
, ˆ vSN =
b
2
, ˆ vNN =
b
2




Thus there is positive assortative matching. The expected per period payoﬀ
of the bank, however, is the same as that under the anonymous social penalty
function, i.e. θr−θ−1. In contrast to Section 3.2 though, in this case group-
lending would not have been feasible without positive assortative matching.
5.2 Contingent Lending
Consider a game that is the same as that in Section 4.1, with the diﬀerence
that the social penalty function is non-anonymous. Recall that for Proposi-
tions 3 and 4, the argument does not depend on the presence, and thus on
the nature, of the social penalty. Thus they go through in this case also.
5.3 Sequential Financing With Contingent Lending
Consider a game that is the same as that in Section 4.2, with the diﬀerence
that we now use the alternative social penalty function. Clearly, for δ ≥
b−H+r
b , the argument is not aﬀected. For δ < b−H+r
b also, the analysis is
Section 4.1 goes through whenever the borrowers are members of SS, or NN
20type groups. However, given the social penalty function, an S type borrower




, ˆ VSN =
b
2
, ˆ VNN =
b
2




Hence, there is positive assortative matching if and only if b−H+r
b > δ >
b−2H+2r
b , with the expected payoﬀ of the bank being given by (10).
We can now write down our ﬁnal proposition.
Proposition 7. Suppose that δ ≤ b−2H+2r
b , and the social penalty func-
tion is non-anonymous. In case there is both sequential ﬁnancing and con-
tingent lending, the outcome involves negative assortative matching, and,
for θ ≤ 1/2, group-lending is not feasible. Whereas, if there is sequential
ﬁnancing alone, then there is positive assortative matching, and, moreover,
group-lending is feasible whenever θr − θ − 1 ≥ 0.27
Proposition 7 demonstrates that putting diﬀerent incentive schemes to-
gether, without giving due attention to how these might interact, may be
counter-productive.28
While the result may appear paradoxical, the intuition is simple. In case
there is both sequential ﬁnancing and contingent lending, the combination
is suﬃcient to ensure that, in an SS type group, both the borrowers invest
in their ﬁrst projects, leading to a payoﬀ of H−r
1−δ for both. Whereas, if
there is sequential ﬁnancing alone, then, in an SS group, a borrower invests
in her ﬁrst project if she is the ﬁrst recipient, but not otherwise (since in
this case there is less of an incentive to invest in her ﬁrst project). This
implies that the payoﬀ of both the borrowers is H−r+b
2 . Clearly, for δ small,
H−r
1−δ < H−r+b
2 . Hence, there is negative assortative matching in case there is
both sequential ﬁnancing and contingent renewal, and positive assortative
matching in case there is sequential ﬁnancing alone. Further, when both
the schemes are used in conjunction, S type borrowers invest in their second
27Consider an example where H = 4, r = 3.1, b = 2, s = 1.2, θ = 0.5 and δ = 0.3.
28Suppose social capital is anonymous. From equations (4), (10), (11) and (12), it
then follows that, whenever group-lending is feasible under sequential ﬁnancing alone (i.e.
θr − θ − 1 ≥ 0), it is also feasible under a combination of social capital and contingent
lending. Thus an analogue of Proposition 7 cannot hold if social capital is anonymous.
21projects whenever they have N type partners (since the social capital is non-
anonymous). Hence, for θ ≤ 1/2, lending is not feasible. Whereas if there is
sequential ﬁnancing alone, then positive assortative matching implies that
lending is feasible whenever θr − θ − 1 ≥ 0.
Finally, along with the earlier result that contingent renewal fails to
harness the social capital, Proposition 7 suggests that schemes involving
contingent renewal needs to be used with care, especially if the discount
factor is small.
6 Discussion
In this section we discuss the robustness of our analysis with respect to some
of the modelling assumptions.
We ﬁrst brieﬂy examine the possible implications if the rate of interest,
instead of being exogenous, is endogenously determined by the bank. In
particular, would such ﬂexibility allow the bank to improve the pool of
potential borrowers, either by screening out ‘bad’ borrowers (as in Ghatak
(2000) and Tassel (1999)), or by inducing more ‘good’ borrowers to join the
pool of potential applicants (as in Ghatak (1999))?
For simplicity we focus on the case where b > H −r > b−s and H > r.
This may be justiﬁed as follows. If b ≤ H −r, then the rate of interest may
be too low for the bank to break even. Whereas if b − s ≥ H − r, then
borrowers of both types will default. Finally if H ≤ r, then not only do N
type borrowers default, S type borrowers either default, or are not willing
to take the loan at all.
We ﬁrst observe that since H − r > 0, all borrowers ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to borrow. Thus all ‘good’ borrowers are already in the pool of potential
applicants and hence, unlike in Ghatak (1999), it is not possible to improve
the pool any further by attracting more ‘good’ borrowers. We then examine
if it is possible to screen out ‘bad’ (i.e. N type) borrowers. Under any
equilibrium where there is positive assortative matching, and the N type
borrowers invest in their second project, their payoﬀs are independent of the
rate of interest. Whereas if the equilibrium involves the N type borrowers
investing in their ﬁrst projects, screening them out is not required. Thus,
22in contrast to Ghatak (2000) and Tassel (1999), the rate of interest and the
extent of joint liability cannot be used to screen out ‘bad’ borrowers.
We next examine the group-formation process in somewhat greater de-
tail.29 Recall that the optimal sorting principle presumes that side-payments
are feasible. Following Ghatak (2000), we can appeal to non-pecuinary forms
of transfers, e.g. providing free labor services and the use of agricultural
implements, to justify side-payments.30 Moreover, contracts involving side-
payments have to be enforceable. For S type borrowers, we can appeal to
the social penalty s itself, to ensure enforceability.31 Under negative assor-
tative matching though, formation of SN type groups would require type N
members to commit to side-payments to S type borrowers. In this case, of
course, we cannot appeal to the social penalty s to ensure enforceability.
In order to deal with this question, let us extend the model so that the N
type agents also has some social capital, say s0. In case an N type borrower
defaults, either to the bank, or on side-payments, and it harms the other
borrowers, the defaulter loses this social capital. In the spirit of our model
we assume that s0 < s. Moreover, s0 must satisfy s0 < b − H + r, otherwise
an analogue of Assumption 2 will hold for the N type borrowers.
To begin with, let us examine the possibility of negative assortative
matching for the case where there is sequential ﬁnancing, but no contingent
renewal. For SN type groups, suppose the side-payment contract states
that, irrespective of whoever is the ﬁrst recipient of the loan, the S type
borrower has a net payoﬀ of βˆ vSS, where β (≥ 1) is determined by the
relative bargaining power of the two types.32 Thus the N type member
commits to paying her S type partner βˆ vSS, in case she, i.e. the N type
29We are extremely grateful to an anonymous referee for comments that encouraged us
to think through this discussion.
30Given that in our model the return from the second project is non-veriﬁable, Ghatak’s
(2000) other justiﬁcation, that borrowers can promise to pay their partners out of the
returns from the project, is not applicable to our case.
31Thus the social penalty is invoked twice, ﬁrst to ensure proper project selection and
second for ensuring that side payments are honored. In equilibrium, of course, the social
penalty is never imposed, and thus the threat can be used to enforce the side-contract.
32One can think of other kind of side-contracts. For example, the side-payment may
take place before the loan allocation is decided, so that the S type borrower has an ex
ante net payoﬀ of βˆ vSS. This, however, does not aﬀect our analysis qualitatively.
23member, obtains the loan and βˆ vSS − (H − r), otherwise. Thus, for any
s0 ≥
β(H−r+b)
2 , the side-payment contract will be honored and there will
be negative assortative matching (in footnote 21, for example, for β = 1.1,
s0 = 2.5 would do).
We next consider the possibility of negative assortative matching for
the case where there is both sequential ﬁnancing and contingent lending.
Note that for an analogue of Proposition 5(ii) to go through, s0 must sat-
isfy s0 < b − H−r
1−δ , i.e. δ < b−s0−H+r
b−s0 . For SN type groups, suppose the
side-payment contract states that, irrespective of whoever is the ﬁrst re-
cipient of the loan, the S type borrower has a net payoﬀ of β ˆ VSS. Thus
the N type member commits to paying her S type partner β ˆ VSS, in case
she, i.e. the N type member, obtains the loan and β ˆ VSS − (H − r), other-





s0 . Summarizing the above discussion we obtain the following
analogue of Propositions 5 and 6:
For δ ≥ b−s0−H+r
b−s0 borrowers of both types invest in their ﬁrst projects.
Otherwise, the S type borrowers invest in their ﬁrst projects, and the N type




< δ < b−s0−H+r





b−s0 }, there is negative assortative matching.
Thus, as long as s0 is not too small, i.e. s0 > β(H − r), there will
be negative assortative marching whenever δ is suﬃciently small.33 Even
for s0 > β(H − r), however, (it is easy to check that) negative assortative
matching occurs for a smaller parameter range than that in Proposition 6.
Thus, to summarize, we ﬁnd that our results regarding the possibility of
negative assortative matching go through qualitatively as long as s0 is not
too small.
Finally we consider the linkage between social capital and social penalty.
While Floro and Yotopolous (1991) emphasize the importance of social capi-
tal, Besley and Coate (1995) put more emphasis on social penalties.34 Under
33In footnote 25, for example, for β = 1.1 and s
0 = 2.5, there is negative assortative
matching for all δ ≤ 0.1.
34In fact, Wydick (1999) ﬁnds that while group-pressure is important in ensuring bor-
24our framework, however, the two are complementary, rather than compet-
itive. While the mere presence of social capital does not aﬀect repayment
rates, the presence of social capital is a necessary condition for the imposi-
tion of social penalties.
7 Conclusion
Given the widespread adoption of group-lending schemes, we need a clear
understanding of the various aspects of such schemes. In this paper we focus
on some dynamic aspects of such schemes that have been relatively neglected
in the literature, namely sequential ﬁnancing and contingent renewal.
We show that under the appropriate parameter conﬁgurations, there is
positive assortative matching, so that the bank can test whether a group is
good or bad relatively cheaply, i.e. without lending to all its members, thus
leading to a partial screening out of bad borrowers. Hence, given the ap-
propriate parameter conﬁgurations, group-lending would be feasible. More-
over, in contrast to most of the literature, there may be negative assortative
matching if the discount factor is suﬃciently small.
The analysis also suggests that schemes involving contingent renewal
needs to be used with care. First, contingent renewal by itself may lead to
collusion, thus failing to harness the social capital. Hence it can resolve the
moral hazard problem if and only if the discount factor is relatively large.
Further, in case the social penalty is non-anonymous, and the discount factor
is relatively small, sequential ﬁnancing by itself may be feasible, whereas a
combination of sequential ﬁnancing and contingent renewal may not be.
rowing group performance, at least in the rural context, social ties per se are not.
258 Appendix
Formal Deﬁnition of Renegotiation-proof Equilibria:
Let x = BiBj denote all subgames starting at any node where the group
consisting of the borrowers Bi and Bj has been selected by the bank as the
recipient of the loan.
Let Gx = {g ∈ R2| g is the present discounted payoﬀ vector of the two
borrowers in x, associated with some subgame perfect equilibrium}.
Deﬁnition. Consider R ⊆ Gx. R is internally consistent with respect
to some subgame x if it is non-empty and
(i) r ∈ R implies that, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium yielding
the payoﬀ vector r in x, and moreover, for this equilibrium and for every
history leading to x, the continuation payoﬀ vectors belong to R, and
(ii) for no r,r0 ∈ R it is the case that r  r0.
Deﬁnition. Let R,R0 ⊆ Gx both be internally consistent with respect
to x. Then R directly dominates R0 with respect to x, i.e. R dx R0, if there
exist r ∈ R and r0 ∈ R0 such that r  r0. We say ˆ R dominates ˜ R with
respect to x, i.e. ˆ R d∗
x ˜ R, if there exist R1,···,Rn (Ri ⊆ Gx), all of them
internally consistent with respect to x, such that ˆ R dx R1 ···Rn dx ˜ R.
Deﬁnition. Consider R ⊆ Gx. Then R is externally consistent with
respect to x if it is non-empty and for every other R0 ⊆ Gx that is internally
consistent with respect to x, if R0 d∗
x R, then R d∗
x R0.
Deﬁnition. R ⊆ Gx is consistent with respect to x if it is both internally
and externally consistent with respect to x.
We are now in a position to deﬁne renegotiation-proofness.
Deﬁnition. A strategy proﬁle is renegotiation-proof (or consistent) if,
∀x, it supports some element of some Rx, where Rx ⊆ Gx is consistent with
respect to x.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider some subgame BiBj. Note that in
any subgame perfect equilibrium, if, in period N, Bi invests in her second
project, then so must borrower Bj (Assumption 1). Thus any subgame
26perfect equilibrium must involve both the borrowers investing in their ﬁrst
projects for T periods, and both deviating in the next period. Thus, in
any subgame perfect equilibrium of BiBj, the present discounted value of
the borrowers payoﬀ must be
(1 − δT)(H − r)
1 − δ
+ δTb. (15)
(i) Consider the case where δ ≥ b−H+r
b . Given the parameter conﬁg-
uration, the strategy where all the borrowers invest in their ﬁrst projects
whenever they obtain the loan, constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium. We then argue that, in fact, the above strategy constitutes the unique
renegotiation-proof equilibrium of this game. Note that at the subgame
BiBj, all continuation present discounted payoﬀ vectors from this strategy
yield (H−r
1−δ , H−r
1−δ ). Thus the set A = {(H−r
1−δ , H−r
1−δ )} is internally consistent.




(1 − δt)(H − r)
1 − δ
+ δtb, (16)
the set A is externally consistent.
We ﬁnally argue that there cannot be any other renegotiation-proof equi-
librium. From equation (16), any other internally consistent set, say A0,
cannot contain (H−r
1−δ , H−r
1−δ ). Hence A directly dominates A0, whereas A0
cannot directly dominate A.
(ii) We then consider the case where δ < b
b−H+r. Given the parameter
values, the strategy where all the borrowers invest in their second projects
whenever they obtain the loan, do constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Note that given Bj is also defaulting, default by Bi does not aﬀect Bj’s
payoﬀ, and hence does not attract the social penalty. Thus the payoﬀ of
both the borrowers is b, irrespective of their types.
We then argue that the above strategy constitutes the unique renegotiation-
proof equilibrium of this game. Since, at BiBj, all continuation present
discounted payoﬀ vector from the above strategy yield (b,b) itself, the set
B = {(b,b)} is internally consistent. Moreover, since ∀t < ∞,
b >
(1 − δt)(H − r)
1 − δ
+ δtb, (17)
27the set B is also externally consistent.
We ﬁnally argue that there cannot be any other renegotiation-proof equi-
librium. From equation (17), any internally consistent set diﬀerent from B,
say B0, cannot contain (b,b). However, in that case B directly dominates
B0, whereas B0 cannot dominate B.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) Consider the case where δ ≥ b−H+r
b and
some subgame BiBj. Given the parameter values, the strategy where all
the borrowers invest in their ﬁrst projects whenever they obtain the loan,
does constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium. Mimicing the argument in
Proposition 3(i), we can argue that the set A = {(H−r
1−δ , H−r
1−δ )} is both inter-
nally and externally consistent for BiBj, and, moreover, the above strategy
constitutes the unique renegotiation-proof equilibrium.
(ii) We next consider the case where δ < b−H+r
b . For any borrower of
type S, at every stage where it obtains the loan, its payoﬀ from investing in
her ﬁrst project is at least H − r, whereas her payoﬀ from investing in her
second project is b − s. Given Assumption 2, it is optimal for the S type
borrowers to invest in their ﬁrst project at every stage they get to invest.
Hence, given the parameter values, it is optimal for the N type borrowers to
always invest in their second projects.
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